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COMMENTARY
EDUCATION AND THE HA NDICAPP ED:
A SURVEY OF RECENT CASE LAW,
THE EDUCATIO N OF ALL HANDICAPPED
CHILDREN ACT AND 504 OF TH E
REHABILITATION ACT
by
Nancy R. Reeves
INTRODUCTIO
All over the United States handicapped ,tudent5 and the_ir par~nts arc
demanding an equal opportunity for an a~propriate educ_at1on. \.\ hat exactly an "appropriate" education means 1s at issue but. m general, ,tate
legislatures and federal courts have ruled that public schooh may no
longer refuse services to any child despite his handicap. \fore recently.
with the passage of the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of
1975' and the implementation of regulations under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.' the federal government has become involved in the
issue. A major part of the controversy over handicapped ,tudents concerns those in special schools and institutions far from their local 5chool
districts who are no,\ seeking admi,sion to home, and schools within
their community. Court decisions indicate that publk schooh mu~t pro,ide appropriate service, for all handicapped children who reside within
the district\ boundarie,. or ,ee that proper wpport service~ are mad,:
available from local agencie,. In short. the court, are setting guideline,
for where, how and with whom an appropriate education for handicapped ,tudent~ takes place.
This comment will discuss the handicapped's right of acce,, to education based on the due process clause and the equal protection clause. Second, the paper will discus, the basic provisions of the Education of All
Handicapped Children Act and their impact on the handicapped's right
to an equal education. And finally the paper will analyze the Si:ction 504
re_gulatlon of the Rehabilitation Act and it s implication for education instnuuons, particularly in light of the Supreme Court ·s recent deci~ion in
Southeastern Community College v. Da~·is.'
I. A GUARA NT EE OF EQUAL ACCESS TO ED LCATIO'\
FOR THE HAMJ I CAPPED
A su~vey of the case law and statutes reveals an interesting theme of
parallelism b~tween the theories espoused for thi: rights of the handicappe~ and the nght to a public education. State comtitutions generally re~~;: \hat a ~r 7e public education be provided to all students within the
· n addition, forty-nme states have enacted mandatory school attendance
· h to f an md1v1dual
. . .
.
• statutes·' howe ver, th e ng
h
cllizen
to attend
sc 001is not absolute. Rather, it is a right qualified by the state's police
power to provide the greatest good for the greatest number. Students
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..
whose physical or mental handicaps prevent them from profiting f
instruction are often excluded from schools .
rom •
In light of the recognized importance of education in Ameri
society, it is not surprising that the constitutionality of these exclusion:an '
practices has become a subject of litigation. Courts have tended to
with "educat_ion" in very br?ad term~. A discussion of the definition :1
equal educational opportunity naturally begins with the proposition i
Brown v. Board of Education' where the Court stated:
n

d:~

Education is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
..:ultural values, in preparing him for later training and in helping him to adjust to his environment. In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an oppor-

tunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it. is a right
which must be made a11ai/able TO all on equal terms.• (emphasis

added)

The landmark decision in Brown establi5hes a right of equalized treatment for all who qualify for public education. The problem is that the
handicapped do not alwa) s "qualify" for public education under many
state statutes. The handicapped want to attend the same schools a;
normal children, but equal educational opportunity for them often
necessitates the right to special education appropriate to their needs. In
the end the question is whether the rationale of the Brown decision that desegregation was demanded because of the nature and goals of
education, among these awakening the child to cultural values, helping
him to adjust to his environment and preparing him to succeed in lifetogether with sub~equent case law and legislation is strong enough to in·
sure equal educational opportunity for the handicapped.
There are two avenues of constitutional attack against exclusionar)
practices. One approach focuses on procedural due proces~. It requires
an investigation into the procedures for categorizing a student as handicapped and hence excludable from education. Although the due process
clause may require a hearing before a handicapped student is denied an
education, the Constitution's procedural .nandate does not insure an
"appropriate" education for all handicapped students. Procedural
guarantees only require the schools to adjudicate the question of a SIU·
dent's eligibility under existing laws and regulations, but they do noi
compel the state nor the school to alter its substantive decision that
education is not granted to all students.
Another area of inquiry invo;ves equal protection considerations
"hich may be a more effective means of overcoming exclusionary pr~ctices given the inherent shortcomings of the due process clause. Unlike
the due proce~~ dause. the equal protection guarantee may place an affirmative duty on Mates to seek out handicapped st udents if they are
totally excluded from education.
The standard of review in equal protection cases depends upon ~th
the nature of the classification involved and the importance of the tn·
tcrcst affected. In most situations, equal protection requires only that the
legislation meet the test of minimum rationality. This requires a showing
that (I) the ends sought constitute a legitimate state purpose and (2) there
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.

b t ntial relationship between the ends sought and the classifica-

,stion
a su
sa
• • · · b <l
"
t •• t a·t
used. However, when a class1 f1cat1on 1s ase ond a h susp~c . r !

when a fundamental interest is affecte , t e leg1s1at1on 1s
sueh as raCe Or
.
b. ted to a more "strict scrutiny." In these cases the state system 1s no
slu iec enti'tled to the usual presumption of validity. Instead, the state
onger
.
1 ··
must show that its system has been normally tailored to serve eg1t1mate

rn~.
.
These principles are essential to an und~rnand1~g of the t_wo key cases
dealing with discrimination against handicapped m educ~uon - . Pennsylvania Association for R.erarded Children v. Pe~ns;:tvania• (hereinafter
cited asP.A.R.C.) and Mills v. Board of Educa/lon. The P.A.R.C. case
was a class action on behalf of mentally retarded children excluded from
the public schools as uneducable or untrainable. Parent~ claimed under
state Jaw and the fourteenth amendment that their children had some
right to a public education. After hearing expert testimony. the court enforced an extensive consent agreement .,.. hich focused on the due process
rights of notice and a hearing for children who are (or arc thought to be)
mentally retarded before they can be excluded from the schools. The
decree provided that the state could not apply any law which would deny
mentally retarded children access to a put,Iic school program. The decree
also stated that it was most de,irable to educate these children in a program similar to that provided to non-handicapped children. In addition,
the court's decbion Y.as buttressrd by an equal protection argument.
Using the rational basis test, the court looked to the expert te~timon:,
(which unanimously showed that all mentall} retarded per\ons are
capable of benefiting from a program of education and training) and
found that there was no rational ba~is for the total exclusion of the plaintiffs from the state's education program.
Following the P.A.R.C. case, another landmark \\a, achieved in .\fills
v. Board of Educatwn. The /\fills case, a clas~ action suit against the
Board of Education of the District of Columbia, the Department of
Human Resources, and the mayor. reaffirmed the P.A.R.C. due prm:es'i
principles and extended their availability placement procrdures for all exceptional children. The Court held that no handicapped child could be
excluded from regular school unles~ adrquate alternative rducational
services suited to the child's need, were- provided. In addition. the court
established the- right to a full due process hearing before a child may be
suspended from ~ehool. The District of Columbia was ordered 10 provide
e_ach child of ~chool age "a free and suitable publicl}•'iupported rducauon regardless of the degree of the child's mental, phy\ical or emotional
disability or impairment." \\'hercas. the P.A. R. C. case never reached
the right to education question becau,.: the court resolved the case bv enforcing an extensive consent agreemrnt, the Mills court declared tha·t the
equal.protection component of the fifth amendrnen1's due procrs, clause
was violated by the total deprivation of educational benefits to the plaintiff.
The idea that emerges from the P.A.R.C. and Mills cases is that the
handicapped student should be in the regular classroom and that he
should have as much contact with normal youth as possible. The cases
seem to say that the closer the handicapped student is to the regular
classroom, the more he will receive the same educational input as the
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non-handicapped student. Thus equal educational opportunity seemst
mean that the school must provide an appropriate input, and the two
cases serve ~s a springboard to assert a constitutional right to educatio~
for all handicapped students. Aside from the question or whether exclu.
sion or the handicapped from public schools affects a Fundamental interest or is based upon a suspect classification and thus subjected to strict
scrutiny, such exclusion~ may be unconstitutional under the rational
basis test of the equal protection clause. Regardless or the various legal
theories used - procedural due process, equal protection or the right to
an education - the courts will continue to be asked to rule that the right
to education for handicapped students necessarily requires the school to
provide program~ that are "appropriate" to their student's needs.
II. EDUCATION OF ALL HANDICAPPEO
CHILDREN ACT OF 1975
Although education in the United States has traditionally been regarded as a responsibility of the ,tates, as recently as 1971 (a year prior to
the P.A.R.C. and Mills decisions), only seven states had adopted mandatory education legislation that included all handicapped children.
Moreover, as pointed out earlier. most states had legislation that effectively excluded handicapped children from a11ending public school or
from at least being integrated into classrooms with normal children.
Given the state's inaction, the federal government became involved in the
issue. The legislation that emerged was the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (hereinafter cited as Act). The first section of
the Act specifies the criteria for state eligibility to receive federal
assistance. Another section requires each ~tate seeking fund~ under the
Act to sub_mit a plan that detail~ the state's policie, Y.ith re~pect to the
education of the handicapped and documents the state's crfom in
meeting these goals. Finally, to qualify for paymencs a local agency mu1t
~ubmit an application in which it provides a\surances that the goals in the
Act are being met.
When read together, these sections impose the following set of requirements. As of the target date of September I, I978, a free, appropriate public education must be available for all handicapped
children aged three to eighteen, and by September I, I980. all handicapped children of ages three through twenty-one must be served. An affirmative obligation is imposed on every local educational agency seeking
funds to identify, locate and evaluate all handicapped students within the
agency's jurisdiction. Thus as of 1978, public policy regarding the education of handicapped children had come Full circle from exclusion to affirmative action. Under the Act there is not a handicapped student who
cannot be helped in some way.
Ill. THE SECTION 504 REGULATION AND ITS IMP LICATIONS
Regardless of whether a state seeks to receive funding under the
Education of all Handicapped Children Act, any school or any program
which receives federal financial funds of any kind is required to provide
handicapped students with an appropriate education, due process ~nd
the least restrictive environment under the regulations complementing
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·r1,.·-nine ,:ontrC'' er,1.i.
· Act. The thl
. 504 of the Rehabili1a11on
sec11on
. 504 state·
words in Sec110n
.
.
ed indindm1l in the L mt~
No otherwise qualified hand,cfahPf handicap be e,dudeJ ir_.:im
1• by reason o 1'
. b·e,:tea
•0
States sha11 soIe)
· d h benefit, of. or be ,u
l .
·
·n" ·eder;1l
. . 1-00 1·n be den1e t e
. .
•J· ,-1
1
paruc1pa 1
•
.
11.ram or acunty re..:..
;
discrimination under an) pro_
money. (emphasis added)
·, alii, .rr.
d.
that would ,eem to d1.qu . .
Does that mean that the very_han ica~t be used to disqualify him~ In the
individual for a job or educauon ~a~~l/e)(e v. Da\'IS case. the Supreme
recent Southeastern Communi:\ fu zz,· questions regarding imerpretaCourt began to sort out some o t e
.
tion of the a~ove langu_ag~.
im le. \\'hen ~\r,. Da, is applied for
The facts m the Davis case ar~ s _P. o at Southea,tern Communi.~
. . f eg'stered nurses trainm,,.
s-h h:d
adm1ss1on or r 1
. .
iven seriou, considerauon. e
College in 1974, the apphcau~n ,,a, g d obviou;h had a strong matt' a1\0rked as a licens_ed practtca /urse a~ut after v~rious test,. the college
tion towards nursing as a pm esls1on. ' ·o se,•Jre that at time, she found
1 D · ' heanng oss wa,'
...
·
•
found that~ rs. av~s
d h d di fficult\' understanding ,,hat \\a, said
it necessary to read ~1ps an ha . . s felt ihat as a re11.isterc:d nur,e she
.
.·h .
k'1 "
10 her. The adm1ss1ons aut onue .
would be in serious difficulty performing certain du~ies. 5 ~'- ~,~or
in a hospital room where e,eryone ,,ould be wearing a ,urgtc ma, .
and therefore denied her admission.
. ..
The district court held fo r the college finding the p\amutf " 3 " not
"otherwise qualified'' 10 be admitted to a nursing pro~ram because _her
hearing disability would prevent her. from complet~ng the re~utred
clinical training, and restrict her effecmeness a, a reg~stered nur,e • On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit rever,ed and _held that _the d_tsmct court erred
by considering the nature of the plaintiff', handicap m order to determine whether or not she was "otherwise qualified" for admtttance. The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal~ in a very narro\\ decision.
The Court ruled " an otherwise quali fied person is one who is able to
meet all of a program's requirement\ in spite of hi, handicap.'' In other
words, a handicapped individual must be able to meet the techmcal and
academic standards of an educational institunon in spite of, not
regardless of, his handicap. Carefully choming ib language the Court
stated that an institution may require "reasonable standards" for admittance to a clinical training program linked to employment or profession.
It is hard to quarrel with the logic of that decision. Ho,\ could the Court
have ruled otherwise and still left educational admissions officers with
the ability to act rationally in the public interest.
Yet, the final question remains unanswered: will all physical ~tandard\
be legitimate or will the courts require validation? Educational institullons may have to modify their programs - substitute courses, expand
the number of years for degree programs or provide auxiliary aid~ - in
0rder to meet "reasonable" standards for handicapped students.
Al th0 ugh the Court has ruled there is no affirmative action obligation
un~er Section 504, in the end it is clear that the courts will continue to ex~are~ull~ each student in light of his particular handicap. Nontscnmtnat1on ts mandated by law.

~t

:mm~
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CONCLUSION
Because the handicapped student requires specialized instruction and
is far more dependent on the schoob to develop his capabilities than normal students. education which does not contribute to that student's maximum academic, social and personal skills may in reality be inap.
propriate.
Education is "political" in its very nature; it is a method of passing
our culture and ways of life from one generation to the next. This
political aspect of schooling has often been in tension with the right to
know, to express and to exercise freedom of speech and freedom of
religion. And the same political aspect has contributed to the turmoil
over education of the handicapped. The right of handicapped students to
an appropriate education may not yet be considered a fundamental right.
It has been shown, however, that the enabling legislation and ~upportive
case law have provided substance and shape to an assertion that there isa
legal right to an equal education opportunity. Therefore, the courts
~hould at least require that any case challenging the handicapped individual's right to an equal educational opportunity be supported by expert testimony. If not, that individual's fundamental interest may be
violated.
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I. P.L. 94-142. 20 U.S.C. §§1401-1461 (Supp. V. 1975).
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4. 374 U .s. 483 ( 1954).
5. Id. at 493.
6. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). approved and adopted, 343 F.
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